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RESPONSE

ONE MARKET WE DO NOT NEED

G IOVANNA S HAY

†

In response to Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 779 (2012).
Professor Volokh is right that American prisons are considered to be
“low quality,” and that they suffer from “high violence rates, bad medical care, [and] overuse of highly punitive measures like administrative
1
segregation . . . .” But his proposed solution—a system of “prison
vouchers” that would permit prisoners to choose their facilities and thus
create a market for prison services—would provide only an illusion of
choice. Even worse, such a system runs the risk of strengthening the
self-interested forces that drive our overgrown system of incarceration.
I commend Professor Volokh for drawing attention to the problem
of abysmal prison conditions and for making the important, and too
often ignored, point that “bad prison conditions often indirectly hurt
2
the rest of society.” And I thank him for creating the opportunity for
a thoughtful exchange about these critical issues. However, his proposal—though fascinating—is flawed.
It is easy to quibble with the specifics of Professor Volokh’s proposal
and to suggest ways in which it will not work. In the piece, he identifies
and counters some of the critiques that I will expand on in this brief
†

Associate Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.
Thanks to James Forman, Jr., for helpful comments.
1
Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA . L. R EV. 779, 784 (2012).
2
Id. at 784-85; see also James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108
M ICH . L. R EV. 993, 1004 (2010) (book review); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14
B ERKELEY J. C RIM . L. 329, 352-61 (2009) (describing the impact of prison policies on
prisoners’ families and communities).

(319)
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Response. But the central problem of the proposal is not the possibility
3
of “market failure” or “market success.” Fundamentally, what makes
me uneasy about Professor Volokh’s proposal is that it reinforces a market mindset toward prisons and the people that they contain.
In their book Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value
of Nothing, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling argue that economic
4
analysis is not appropriate for every policy choice. Some decisions
5
should be made “on the basis of rights and principles,” and some
6
goods, like human life, are “priceless.” To be sure, Professor Volokh is
not suggesting that prisoners bid to obtain minimum conditions or essential medical care. However, his proposed voucher system, rooted in
a faith in markets, takes us one step closer to such a world.
Moreover—and this is really my greatest concern—if markets are
successful, they can grow. And I fear that embracing a market mentality in this area will contribute to the one thing that America really
does not need now: more growth in our system of prisons. Professor
Volokh does a good job of outlining the problems with conditions in
American prisons. But he does not acknowledge the primary condition
afflicting American incarceration. That problem has been analogized
7
to obesity: the system is just too big.
It has become almost trite to talk about the unprecedented scale of
American incarceration. At 2.3 million prisoners, our nation has the
largest absolute number of incarcerated people, and the highest in8
carceration rate, in the world. Commentators across the ideological
9
10
spectrum, from Angela Y. Davis to Justice Kennedy to Newt Gin-

3

Volokh, supra note 1, at 792.
F RANK A CKERMAN & L ISA H EINZERLING , P RICELESS : O N K NOWING THE
P RICE OF E VERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF N OTHING 234 (2004).
5
Id. at 213.
6
Id. at 8.
7
See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 M ARQ . L. R EV. 1241, 1251
(2011) (“Just as obesity can mean that a person has lost the ability to regulate their own
appetite for food, mass incarceration is evidence that our collective appetite
for punishment is out of whack.”).
8
See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report/report_detail.
aspx?id=35904 (listing the number of prisoners under correctional supervisi
on in jails and prisons in 2009).
9
See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 105-06 (2003) (claiming that the current criminal justice system has an “exaggerated dependence on imprisonment”).
10
See Carol J. Williams, Justice Kennedy Laments the State of Prisons in California, U.S.,
L.A. T IMES , Feb. 4, 2010, at AA5 (reporting Justice Kennedy’s disapproval of
excessive incarceration in California).
4
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11

grich, have decried this overreliance on incarceration. In the current economic crisis, this level of incarceration cannot continue. That
is why so many jurisdictions, including some that are notoriously
“tough on crime,” such as Texas, have adopted measures to curb their
12
use of incarceration without compromising public safety. There are
signs that these measures are working to decrease the growth of the
prison population. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) recently released a report explaining that the number of incarcerated people in
13
the United States fell in 2010 for the first time since 1972.
At what could be a critical turning point, I fear that Professor Volokh’s proposal could kick-start prison growth. Although we cannot
say for sure what would happen if a system of “prison vouchers” were
adopted, there is reason to believe that it could unleash some powerful forces. The notion of vouchers for prisoners further normalizes
the idea that corrections is a market and that prisoners are a commod14
ity. It also creates yet another opening for powerful lobbies with
vested economic interests, such as private corrections companies and
15
guards’ unions, to advocate policies that promote incarceration.

11

See Statement on Principles, R IGHT ON C RIME , http://www.rightoncrime.com/theconservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (declaring that government spending on the criminal justice system and incarceration should
be limited, and bearing Newt Gingrich’s signature).
12
See A M . C IV. L IBERTIES U NION (ACLU), S MART R EFORM IS P OSSIBLE :
S TATES R EDUCING I NCARCERATION R ATES AND C OSTS W HILE P ROTECTING C OMMUNITIES 5 (2011) (describing the trend away from incarceration among historically
“tough on crime” states because of increased concern for fiscal responsibility in the
wake of the economic crisis); Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On
in Conservative States, N.Y. T IMES , Aug. 13, 2011, at A14 (same).
13
See PAUL G UERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010,
at 1 (2011) (describing the 0.6% drop in number of prisoners under state
and federal jurisdiction in 2010).
14
Commentators criticizing prison privatization have identified the “commodification” of prisoners as one concern. See, e.g., Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc: The
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L.
R EV. 879, 963-70 & n.308 (2004).
15
See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 532-33
(2005) (describing the power of prison guard unions as a political lobby for incarceration); James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 791, 799-800 (2011) (describing the influence of the Washington, D.C. corrections
officers’ union in opposing prison reforms); Marie Gottschalk, Cell Blocks & Red Ink:
Mass Incarceration, the Great Recession & Penal Reform, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 62, 67
(warning that the recession may not produce lasting reductions in prison populations
because of entrenched interests). See generally ACLU, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE
PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 38 (2011) (describing the “private prison lobby”).
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Professor Volokh takes great pains to point out that he is not advo16
cating prison privatization per se. I can understand why he is eager
to distance his proposal from private prisons, since conditions in some
of them—like conditions in many government facilities—have been
roundly criticized. For example, a recent report by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) describes conditions in a Texas youth facility
17
run by a private prison company, the GEO Group, as “horrid.” Independent auditors sent to monitor the juvenile facility reportedly
“got so much fecal matter on their shoes they had to wipe their
18
feet on the grass outside.” Another new report by the Sentencing
Project catalogues hundreds of brutality complaints at a
Mississippi youth facility that is run by the GEO Group and under
federal investigation, as well as disturbing reports of staff sexual abuse
at a Kentucky Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) facility
19
housing female prisoners from Hawaii.
There is also a troubling “revolving door” between government
20
and private corrections. In one high-profile instance, former Bureau
of Prisons Director Harley Lappin left government service after being
arrested for alleged drunk driving in 2011; soon afterwards, he began
21
working as CCA’s Chief Corrections Officer.
But a “prison vouchers” system can only promote privatization, by
opening yet more arenas in which corrections companies will push to
22
compete. Recent studies have shown how private corrections companies contribute to the growth of incarceration in the United States
23
by advocating policies that promote prisons. Detention Watch Network released a report stating that CCA spent more than eighteen mil24
lion dollars on lobbying between 1999 and 2009. Private prison
16

See Volokh, supra note 1, at 803-05.
See ACLU, supra note 15, at 37.
18
Id. (quoting Doug J. Swanson, TYC Investigates Staff for Ties to Jail Operator, D ALL.
M ORNING N EWS , Oct. 6, 2007, at 1A).
19
CODY MASON, SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: PRIVATE PRISONS
IN AMERICA 11 (2012).
20
See ACLU, supra note 15, at 36.
21
Id.
22
See M ASON , supra note 19, at 16 (“[P]rivate prison companies use their influence
to increase profits by taking advantage of and continuing the nation’s longstanding reliance on incarceration.”).
23
See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 15, at 32; see also James Ridgeway, Locking Up Profits,
A L J AZEERA (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2011/11/20111127105458655442.html (describing three studies on private
prison companies, including reports by the ACLU and Detention Watch Network).
24
D ETENTION WATCH N ETWORK , T HE I NFLUENCE OF THE P RIVATE P RISON
I NDUSTRY IN THE I MMIGRATION D ETENTION B USINESS 3 (2011), available at
17
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companies make political contributions as well—according to the Sentencing Project, “an average of over $430,000 per election cycle, with
25
nearly 70 percent going toward Republican candidates.” CCA lobbyists have even drafted laws to promote more draconian immigration
policies and enforcement in order to expand the pool of Immigration
26
and Customs Enforcement detainees. The American Legislative Exchange Coalition, which reportedly includes CCA and Wackenhut
among its members, has been described as “the most powerful lobby
27
you’ve never heard of,” sponsoring so-called “truth-in-sentencing”
28
reforms, which have produced longer sentences in some forty states.
It is not only private corrections companies that are invested in expanding the market in prisoners. Guards’ unions, such as the California Correctional and Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), also lobby
29
for harsher sentences. In a speech to Los Angeles lawyers, Justice
Kennedy lamented the fact that the corrections officers union was the
30
sponsor of California’s three-strikes law, saying, “that is sick!”
Creating an even more explicit market in prisoners through prison
vouchers can only compound these troubling trends. Professor Volokh might counter that his proposal at least will improve conditions
by permitting inmates to vote as to the most humane prisons by exer31
cising choice. But getting accurate information about conditions on
the ground in any prison facility is truly daunting.
In describing the problems of America’s prisons, Professor Volokh’s paper cites the report of the Commission on Safety and Abuse
32
in America’s Prisons, a commission convened by the Vera Institute
and composed of corrections experts. Although the commission’s
report commends the BJS’s data collection efforts, it also acknowledges that there simply is no information available about many aspects of

http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/
PrivatePrisonPDF-FINAL%205-11-11.pdf.
25
M ASON , supra note 19, at 15.
26
See D ETENTION WATCH N ETWORK , supra note 24, at 3.
27
Dolovich, supra note 15, at 523, 526 (citing Nick Penniman, Outing ALEC: The
Most Powerful Lobby You’ve Never Heard Of, A M . P ROSPECT , July 1, 2002, at 12).
28
Id. at 527; MASON, supra note 19, at 13 (describing how private prison companies were involved in the drafting of model legislation, including “mandatory minimum sentences, three strikes laws, and truth-in-sentencing, all of which
contribute to higher prison populations”).
29
Dolovich, supra note 15, at 530-31.
30
See Williams, supra note 10, at AA5.
31
See Volokh, supra note 1, at 784 (arguing that inmates “would become consumers
and thus drive reform by voting with [their] feet”).
32
Id. at 785 n.18.
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33

prison life. The report quotes the BJS chief statistician, Allen Beck,
as saying, “The level of assaults is simply not known. I cannot measure
well the level of assault using administrative records as they exist to34
day.” Nationwide statistics on prison sexual violence were not even
collected until 2004, when the first survey was conducted as a result of
35
the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003.
Professor Volokh suggests that prison operators could publicize in36
formation regarding their facilities. This response mistakes advertising for accurate information.
Private prison companies have
marketing departments that churn out only positive stories and Inter37
net sites. As the ACLU points out, “no one would know from CCA’s
website that one of its employees sexually abused multiple female immigration detainees, or that one of its facilities is allegedly so violent
38
that it has been dubbed the ‘gladiator school.’” Private prison companies may be exempt from information-sharing mechanisms such as
39
the Freedom of Information Act and some state records laws. CCA
has—unsuccessfully—resisted a request to turn over settlement documents and complaints to the leading publication for prisoner rights,
40
Prison Legal News. Some private prison companies have even sought
to thwart efforts by their shareholders to obtain information about
41
issues such as political contributions.
Professor Volokh suggests that defendants could seek information
regarding prisons from “friends or neighbors who have been in prison,”
42
or from their defense lawyers. If a defendant’s friends are incarcerated, then their phone calls and letters almost certainly will be moni43
tored by censors. If the defendant’s friends have been released, then
their information will be dated. Moreover, former inmates’ perspec33

See C OMM ’ N ON S AFETY & A BUSE IN A MERICA’ S P RISONS , C ONFRONTING
C ONFINEMENT 24 (2006) (“BJS has made significant progress in improving the
validity, reliability, and comprehensiveness of the data on violence, but there are still
significant weaknesses and blind spots.”).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See Volokh, supra note 1, at 830.
37
See ACLU, supra note 15, at 40.
38
Id. at 40-41.
39
Id. at 41.
40
Judge Favors Plaintiff in Private Prison Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2011, available
at http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/59923.
41

See ACLU, supra note 15, at 41 (describing a shareholder proposal that CCA defeated, which would have required more transparency about political contributions).
42
Volokh, supra note 1, at 830.
43
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 (1974) (upholding a prison regulation monitoring prisoners’ legal mail for contraband).
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tives necessarily will be anecdotal and limited to the facilities where they
were incarcerated, with little aggregate data or basis for comparison.
If there is one factor that is readily apparent to prisoners, it is location. Paul Wright, editor of Prison Legal News, suggests that prisoners
will have strong opinions that the best prisons for them will be the
44
ones closest to home, so that they can get visitors. However, this
suggests that, in a voucher system, there would be long waiting lists
for the facilities closest to large population centers—a far cry
from a system in which prisoner choice drives improvements in conditions and programmatic offerings. Professor Volokh might counter that prisoner preference for proximity to home would create a
push for more prisons to be built near cities. But given the major
investment required to build new prisons, and higher land values
45
near cities, it could be a long wait.
As for defense counsel, they usually are not able to gain
access to facilities to evaluate whether their marketing claims are
accurate.
Even if counsel could tour prisons, attorneys may
lack the professional skills to evaluate critical functions such as
46
health care.
Moreover, indigent defense systems in many parts
47
of the country are overwhelmed and underresourced. Relying on
defense lawyers to evaluate competing claims regarding prison
conditions is overly optimistic at best.
Professor Volokh argues that prisoners’ decisions to transfer between facilities will serve as an effective mechanism for exercising
48
prisoner choice. But the information barriers for would-be lateral
transfers are too high for this mechanism to work smoothly. Prison
44

Email from Paul Wright, Editor, Prison Legal News, to author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on
file with the author).
45
Cf. Stephen C. Fehr, New Motive for Springing Lorton Site: Valuable Real Estate Tied
Up at District’s Prison Complex, WASH . P OST , June 13, 1996, at B1 (describing how,
as Fairfax County became more populous, officials and developers began to consider
closing a Washington D.C. prison in the northern Virginia suburbs because of the
site’s “development potential”).
46
See Margo Schlanger et al., ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, C RIM . J UST., Summer 2010, at 14, 16-17 (recognizing that the bar has an important but necessarily limited role to play in improving conditions of confinement).
47
See A M . B AR A SS ’ N , S TANDING C OMM . ON L EGAL A ID & I NDIGENT D EFENDANTS , GIDEON’S B ROKEN P ROMISE : A MERICA’ S C ONTINUING Q UEST FOR E QUAL
J USTICE 7-14 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel
_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (describing specific problems defense
counsel for indigent clients face, including lack of funding and essential resources,
such as expert, investigative, and support services).
48
See Volokh, supra note 1, at 819-23.
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regulations typically forbid prisoners from corresponding with in49
mates at other facilities for security reasons. Prisoners may lack access to the Internet and may encounter difficulty in receiving
publications, or in keeping certain amounts of printed material in
50
their cells. For example, Prison Legal News is censored in numerous
51
states. To be sure, a correctional facility might have an incentive to
keep information about competitors from reaching its residents.
There are also larger structural issues that could inhibit the use of
prisoner choice as a means of shaping corrections services. Although
Professor Volokh’s proposal is not fully identified with privatization, we
can look to the current private prisons system to anticipate potential
problems in a market created by prisoners’ vouchers. Professor Richard
Culp of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice recently has commented that the private prisons market is an “oligopoly” in which four com52
panies possess ninety-two percent of the market share. He writes that
an oligopoly “is characterized by interdependence, avoidance of competition and a rigid attachment to the status quo among the leading
53
54
55
firms” —hardly a recipe for competence, let alone innovation.
Finally, there is the problem of prisoner choice. Researchers have
contended that choice is constrained even in free-world contexts, such
56
as school choice. I find it particularly unsatisfying to talk about

49

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987) (upholding a prison regulation prohibiting correspondence between inmates at different institutions).
50
See Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and Gender: Prison Regulation of Social Hierarchy
Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. R EV. (forthcoming Oct. 2012) (“In my experience of
communicating with imprisoned people who sought to comment on proposed National Prison Rape Elimination Commission standards, I found that some prisons would
not allow the full standards into the jail, at times objecting that they were ‘too long.’”).
51
For a map of states in which Prison Legal News has litigated for access, see PLN in
Action, P RISON L EGAL N EWS , https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/plnmap.aspx (last
visited Feb. 15, 2012).
52
Richard Culp, The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization, P RISON L EGAL N EWS, Oct.
2011, at 1, 4; see also M ASON , supra note 19, at 2 (reporting that CCA and the GEO
Group “manage over half of the [private corrections] contracts in the United States,
[resulting in] combined revenues exceeding $2.9 billion in 2010”).
53
Culp, supra note 52, at 3.
54
See Dora Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for Criminal Inmates and Immigrant Detainees, 47 A M . C RIM . L. R EV. 1441, 1447-48 (2010) (identifying three key
organizational characteristics for safe conditions of confinement: “capacity, competency, and commitment”).
55
See Culp, supra note 52, at 1-3.
56
See Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 G EO . J. ON
P OVERTY L. & P OL’ Y 1, 38 (2008) (discussing studies showing that, in choosing among
schools, parents “rely on their existing social networks,” and that parents’ perception
of their available choices is determined in large part by their social class).
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choice in the context of a criminal punishment system that is inherently coercive and that is marked by persistent, systemic racial and so57
How are prisoners to exercise choice
cioeconomic disparity.
effectively when their attempts to notify authorities of systemic wrong58
59
doing meet with mockery or retaliation? How are they to do so
60
61
when they are illiterate, or possess limited proficiency in English?
Is choice a realistic concept for the prisoners who have mental illness62
es, estimated to be more than fifty percent of inmates? How about
63
for those who are held in segregation? Prof. Volokh argues that
"[t]he inmate's family or an appointed legal guardian could make the
64
choice," but this does not address the barriers that non-prisoners
face in obtaining accurate information regarding conditions on-theground in corrections facilities. Prisoners are not consumers shopping for home mortgages (although we also could debate
whether that market worked). They are the dispossessed of our society, held in situations designed to minimize their access to
information and their exercise of autonomy.
The report of the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s
Prisons proposes a different solution to the problem of poor prison

57

See M ICHELLE A LEXANDER , T HE N EW J IM C ROW : M ASS I NCARCERATION IN
A GE OF C OLORBLINDNESS 2 (2010) (contending that discrimination that was
once directed toward African-Americans is now directed toward “criminal,” who are
disproportionately African-American); Forman, supra note 15, at 795 (arguing that
middle class African-Americans should consider ways in which they are also invested in
the criminal punishment status quo).
58
See Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 531 n.20 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that,
upon reporting repeated rapes, Roderick Johnson was informed by prison authorities,
“[w]e don’t protect punks on this farm”).
59
See Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 742-43 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing systemic sexual abuse and harassment of prisoners, followed by widespread retaliation against those who reported wrongdoing).
60
See N AT ’ L C TR . FOR E DUC . S TATISTICS , L ITERACY B EHIND P RISON WALLS :
P ROFILES OF THE P RISON P OPULATION FROM THE N ATIONAL A DULT L ITERACY
S URVEY 31 (1994) (observing that sixty-eight percent of prisoners performed at the
lowest two levels on the prose literacy scale).
61
See id. at 45 (observing that eleven percent of prisoners report coming from a
household in which only a language other than English was spoken, while nine percent
report growing up in a house in which both English and another language were spoken).
62
D ORIS J. J AMES & L AUREN E. G LAZE , B UREAU OF J USTICE S TATISTICS , M ENTAL H EALTH P ROBLEMS OF P RISON AND J AIL I NMATES 1 (2006).
63
See Margo Schlanger, Regulating Segregation: The Contribution of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1421, 1432-33 (2010) (describing harms of long-term segregation, including physical and mental deterioration).
64
Volokh, supra note 1, at 801.
THE
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65

conditions—external monitoring.
This is a measure adopted by
some other mature democracies, including the United Kingdom and
66
67
Sweden, and advocated by the American Bar Association (ABA).
However, the reform that I would prioritize is simpler—fewer prisoners. The greatest inhumanity of our current system is its sprawling
68
size, producing crushing overcrowding in some systems, and multiplying its effects on families and communities on a scale that
69
is hard to fathom. The ABA is working on a state policy initiative
70
designed to reduce states’ reliance on incarceration. The ABA advocates measures that have been demonstrated to safeguard public safety
while reducing prison populations, such as pretrial detention reform,
decriminalization of low-level offenses, use of community
71
corrections, and changes to parole.
Just when it seems that the United States may be turning a corner,
Professor Volokh’s “prison vouchers” proposal runs the risk of reinforcing entrenched interests that have contributed to prison expansion.
This is one market that we do not need.

65

See C OMM ’ N ON S AFETY AND A BUSE IN A MERICA’ S P RISONS , supra note 33, at
16 (“Every U.S. prison and jail should be monitored by an independent government
body, sufficiently empowered and funded to regularly inspect conditions of confinement and report findings to lawmakers and the public.”).
66
See S ILJA J.A. TALVI , W OMEN B EHIND B ARS : T HE C RISIS OF W OMEN IN THE
U.S. P RISON S YSTEM 236 (2007) (describing the role of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector
of Prisons in the United Kingdom); Michele Deitch, Special Populations and the Importance of Prison Oversight, 37 A M . J. C RIM . L. 291, 304-05, 308-09 (2010) (describing
the British Prison Inspectorate and the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman).
67
See A M . B AR . A SS ’ N , ABA S TANDARDS FOR C RIMINAL J USTICE : T REATMENT
OF P RISONERS standard 23-11.3 (3d ed. 2010) (advocating external monitoring and
inspection by independent agencies).
68
See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1944-45 (2011) (upholding a lower court decision requiring that the prison population be capped at 137.5% of design capacity).
69
See Megan Comfort, Punishment Beyond the Legal Offender, 3 A NN . R EV. L. & S OC .
S CI . 271, 280 (2007) (describing the disruption in a child’s upbringing that a mother’s
imprisonment can cause); Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, D AEDALUS , Summer 2010, at 8, 8 (arguing that “mass incarceration . . . deepens
disadvantage and forecloses mobility for the most marginal in society”).
70
See State Policy Implementation Project, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www2.americanbar.org/
sections/criminaljustice/CR203800/Pages/statepolicyproject.aspx (last visited Feb. 15,
2012); see also Shima Baradaran, Op-Ed., The Right Way to Shrink Prisons, N.Y. T IMES ,
May 31, 2011, at A23 (recommending reforms to pretrial detention to reduce prison
and jail overcrowding, as advocated by the ABA).
71
State Policy Implementation Project, supra note 70.
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